JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The potential harmful effects of non-indigenous species introduced for biological control remain an important unanswered question, which we addressed by undertaking a literature review. There are few documented instances of damage to non-target organisms or the environment from non-indigenous species released for biological pest control, relative to the number of such releases. However, this fact is not evidence that biological control is safe, because monitoring of non-target species is minimal, particularly in sites and habitats far from the point of release. In fact, the discovery of such impacts usually rests on a remarkable concatenation of events. In addition to trophic and competitive interactions between an individual introduced species and a native one, many effects of introduced species on ecosystems are possible, as are numerous types of indirect interactions. Predicting such impacts is no mean feat, and the difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that introduced species can disperse and evolve. Current regulation of introduced biologicalcontrol agents, particularly of entomophages, is insufficient. At the very least, strong consideration should be given to the likely impact of both the pest and its natural enemy on natural ecosystems and their species, and not only on potential costs to agriculture, silviculture, and species of immediate commercial value.
INTRODUCTION
An increasingly contentious debate has polarized the pest-control community about potential harmful effects of non-indigenous species introduced for biological control purposes. Howarth (1983 , Gagne and Howarth 1985 first argued that such introductions had probably already produced extinctions of non-target species, and that existing protocols for assessing likely outcomes of such introductions were woefully inadequate. This view has attracted support from several workers who cite specific cases of insufficient consideration of potential impacts, likely problems from introduced control agents, or both (e.g., Ehler 1991 , Simberloff 1992 , Lockwood 1993a . It has also attracted vigorous rebuttals from biological-control practitioners who argue that the specific problem cases are unproven, that the general problem is greatly overstated, that there is no inherent reason why biological control is risky, and that existing protocols go a long way towards minimizing the already-low probability of unforeseen potential debacles (e.g., Funasaki et al. 1988 , Lai 1988 , Gonzalez and Gilstrap 1992, Carruthers and Onsager 1993). Many of these biological-control advocates concede that early projects, particularly using generalized vertebrate predators, caused unintended damage, but say that such events are far removed from the world of biological control today. DeLoach (1991) goes so far as to assert that current procedures in the United States completely prevent traditional biological-control projects from affecting nontarget species.
Probably a fraction of the heated reaction is visceral, and stems from a sense almost of betrayal. After all, biological control has been advanced for many years as a green alternative to chemical control, and the great majority of its practitioners surely entered the field as idealists, seeking to stem environmental destruction (Center 1995) . To then be tarred with the same brush as the pesticide "nozzleheads" must be a cruel blow. Nevertheless, in the light of increasing knowledge of the scope of the environmental damage caused by nonindigenous species (e.g., U.S. Congress OTA 1993), the arguments of both critics and defenders of biological control deserve careful consideration.
PREDATION, PARASITISM, AND HERBIVORY OF NON-TARGET SPECIES
Many generalized predators released for biological control have preyed on non-target species (Simberloff 1992) . For example, the small Indian mongoose (Herpestes auropunctatus), introduced to the West Indies, Hawaiian islands, Mauritius, and Fiji to control rats in agricultural fields, has contributed to the decline of native birds in all those areas (Cheke 1987 ; references in Lever 1985 , Simberloff 1992 . It has probably eliminated native reptile species in the West Indies (Honegger 1981). The predatory snail Euglandina rosea has been introduced from Florida and Central America to many islands worldwide to control the giant African snail Achatina fulica (Civeyrel and Simberloff 1996) . At least in the Hawaiian and Tahitian archipelagoes, it has extinguished several endemic forest snails.
Generalized herbivores introduced for biological control of weeds have similarly had unintended effects on native species. Perhaps the most prominent introductions of this sort are of freshwater fishes (Moyle et al. 1986 , Courtenay and Williams 1992 , Courtenay 1993 ). The full effects of these fish introductions are unknown, but many such control agents have so greatly reduced the native vegetation that they have changed the composition of native fish communities. In fact, it appears that every fish introduction for biological control that has been thoroughly studied has had major detrimental effects on non-target organisms, whatever its impact on the target species.
Although it has been asserted that phytophagous insects introduced for terrestrial weed control have never caused the elimination of non-target native species (e.g., Groves 1989, DeLoach 1991), examples are known in which such non-target plants have been so reduced as to cast doubt on the assertion. For example, the semaphore cactus (Opuntia spinosissima) was represented in the United States by only a few plants in the Torch Wood Hammock Preserve of the Nature Conservancy, in the Florida Keys. It is a candidate for listing under the Endangered Species Act; all other records are from the south coast of Jamaica, and there is reasonable doubt that the two populations are conspecific. The individuals in the preserve have been severely impacted by caterpillars of the moth Cactoblastis cactorum (Kass 1990 , Robertson 1990 Elliott et al. 1996 ; P Kareiva, personal communication). As noted below, the full effects of such a dramatic change in a numerous taxon on various community and ecosystem phenomena are unknown, but it would be surprising if no major impact occurred.
UNEXPECTED EFFECTS
We have so far restricted our discussion to straightforward interactions among species, one on one. Introduced species can wreak havoc with native species in much more tortuous ways. Consider the ad hoc attempt to control rabbits in Great Britain by introducing the Myxoma virus (Ratcliffe 1979 (Paine 1966 (Paine , 1969 ): a species whose grazing or predatory activity markedly changes th-e composition of a numerically dominant and physically structuring trophic level of a community, thus leading to a dramatic change in the physical structure itself. In fact, Harper (1969) long ago noted the keystone role of rabbits in Great Britain and how myxomatosis consequently led to great community changes, though he focussed on plant species. What is really remarkable about the extinction of the large blue (butterfly, Maculina arion) is not that it happened but that anyone noticed it. We return to this point below (see The problem of insufficient monitoring). Simberloff (1991) argued that the keystone-species concept might provide an entree into the morass of predicting major environmental impacts of introduced species; a non-native species that destroys or constitutes a classical keystone species or that itself becomes a dominant structural element in the habitat might be expected to have a huge impact, though the particulars of that impact might not be easily predicted. Lately the concept of a keystone species has been attacked (Mills et al. 1993) on the grounds that the definition has been so expanded as to encompass just about any species that someone cares about, and thus has no real utility in indicating which species have some special, disproportionate influence on the entire community. Further, there is often no experimental verification of this influence. However, this argument seems an overreaction (cf. DeMaynadier and Hunter 1994). That some researchers have misused the term does not mean it is devoid of content; the experiments reported by Paine (1966 Paine ( , 1969 and Harper (1969) met the strict criteria and truly elucidated the key roles of particular species in the determination of community composition and physical structure.
The frequent absence of evidence that a putative keystone species plays this role is, of course, a serious problem, but it is simply part of a problem that pervades all community-and ecosystem-level ecology controlled experiment is difficult and often not attempted. Still, this problem does not render community and ecosystem ecology less "scientific" or mean that events and observations at these levels are either unimportant or uninstructive (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993).
Rather, it dictates caution in interpreting and extrapolating results. For the rabbit in Great Britain, both experiments and carefully planned observations (Harper 1969) verified its keystone role. For other species in other systems the designation must be tentative. However, at the very least one would expect that an introduced species that eliminates or greatly modifies an entire large taxon might play this role; the Australian brown tree snake in Guam, the Nile perch in Lake Victoria, and certain ant species in various locations all come to mind (Simberloff 1991) .
A controversial program mounted by the United States Department of Agriculture to introduce non-indigenous species to control native rangeland grasshoppers in the West (Carruthers and Onsager 1993, Lockwood 1993a, b) may fall in this category. The plan was to release an Australian scelionid wasp (Scelio parvicornis) and an Australian fungal pathogen (Entomophaga praxibuli). Upon objection that ecological costs had not been adequately assessed, the wasp release was postponed, although the fungus had already been released in two states. Among the 300-odd grasshoppers of western rangelands, there are no introduced species (Lockwood 1993a ). Most of these grasshoppers in most years in most places are not harmful to human interests, and some are believed to be ecologically beneficial. But there has been no thorough study of all their exact ecological roles, as with those of so many other insects. They may suppress various weeds. For example, one non-target species, Hesperotettix viridis, feeds on plants poisonous to livestock, which might well increase in their absence. Grasshoppers surely compete with other pest insects and almost certainly contribute to determining the composition and therefore physical structure of plant communities. They vector symbionts such as mycorrhizal fungi, they vector microbial pathogens, and, by sheer numbers, they must contribute greatly to nutrient cycling. What would happen to any of these processes if any non-target or even target species disappeared or greatly declined is simply not predictable given the current state of knowledge of community and ecosystem ecology of grasslands. But it seems very likely that something important would happen, even if we cannot predict what it would be. What is more doubtful is whether we would ever know what happened, and why.
THE "NEW ASSOCIATIONS" AND "NEOCLASSICAL CONTROL" CONTROVERSY
The grasshopper case is particularly controversial because it entails importing non-native species to control native ones, whereas "classical biological control" is typically defined (e.g., Nechols and Kauffman 1992) as controlling non-native pests by importing species, often antagonists from the pests' regions of origin.
Lockwood (1993a) suggests the term "neoclassical biological control" when an introduced antagonist of a native species is used. This approach automatically raises warning flags because it is not based, as is much classical biological control, on a close coevolutionary association between pest and enemy. The presence of a wild card seems much more likely than in classical biological control. After all, if the pest and enemy have never seen one another before, is the probability not increased that non-target species will be affected at least as much as the target will?
A guiding principle of neoclassical control is the "new association" hypothesis of Hokkanen and Pimentel (1984, 1989) . In essence, the hypothesis is that totally new associations are likely to be more devastating to the pest precisely because the pest has not coevolved with its enemies. One can understand the rationale by analogy to the evolution of benignity in disease-host relationships (e.g., Ewald 1983). Often the first wave of an introduced epizootic disease devastates the host, but subsequent coevolution, including evolution of disease resistance by the host species and of less virulent genotypes of the pathogen, makes successive waves progressively less catastrophic. Because it is not in the pathogen's "interest" to eliminate its host, natural selection inexorably leads to a more benign relationship. The trajectory of the myxoma virusrabbit interaction in Australia is a good example from biological control (Williamson 1992) .
Hokkannen and Pimentel (1984, 1989) marshal literature data to show that many, perhaps most, truly effective biological-control programs involve new associations of host and enemy, and often they entail new-host use by species previously considered monophagous or oligophagous. This claim has been criticized, but the grounds of the criticism are essentially haggling over the exact numbers, not over the fact that new associations are often effective for biological control. For example, Waage and Greathead (1988) reanalyzed a subset of the data analyzed by Hokkanen and Pimentel, using somewhat different criteria for project "success," and concluded that, rather than a typically better result with new associations, there is no difference between new and old associations in likelihood of producing economically important control.
With respect to untoward consequences of a biological-control introduction, the very species that are most likely to produce effective neoclassical biological control are those preadapted to use new hosts, and these are therefore the greatest threats to non-target species (Roderick 1992) . Of course, the circumstances of many biological-control releases small propagules isolated from conspecific populations in new environmentsfacilitate rapid evolution (Roderick 1992), which might be expected to lessen effectiveness of control for the reasons just stated, but might also lessen effects on non-target species initially attacked.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
A common response to concerns about unintended effects of biological-control introductions is that, whatever the ecological costs of a particular project, the costs of not doing the project may well be greater (e.g., Harris 1990, Nechols et al. 1992, Center 1995). For example, the imported fire ant Solenopsis invicta has, in 50 yr, spread over much of the Deep South, with numerous publicized agricultural and medical effects (Tschinkel 1993) . Lately it has been recognized as a conservation concern, with the spectre of still-greater damage looming as the polygynous form spreads (Porter et al. 1988, Porter and Savignano 1990). For example, in Florida it has replaced the native fire ant S. geminata in many habitats; in Texas it is believed to have caused a great decline in horned toads (Phrynosoma) through predation and displacement of harvester ants. Much of the native ant fauna seems threatened (Buren 1983) , and it appears evident that there have been numerous ecosystem-level effects, though we know of no specific study of these. Chemical control has failed, leading to numerous proposals for biological control (Jouvenaz 1990 ). Faced with the high probability of ecological damage if biological control is not attempted, what degree of likely ecological damage from a prospective control agent should be tolerated?
In Florida, the Australian tree Melaleuca quinquenervia is now dominating -20 new hectares daily in spite of intensive manual-control efforts. They transpire as much as four times as much water as the sawgrass community they are replacing in many areas, and have replaced entire native plant communities (Schmitz 1994 ). Could potential damage by an introduced biological-control agent be worse than this? One could make a similar argument in Florida alone for Brazilian pepper (Schinus terebinthifolius) and Australian pine (Casuarina spp.). In each instance, extensive tracts of native vegetation have already been replaced and current control methods are not stemming the spread.
Even those most concerned about potential dangers of biological control concede the force of this argument (e.g., Howarth 1991, Simberloff 1992). Assessing likely costs and benefits of the two courses of action, however, is a very difficult matter, and the typical costbenefit analysis for biological control seems one-sided, with costs of pesticides, costs of collecting trips, costs of host-specificity tests, etc., fairly well detailed, but costs of the loss of isolated populations or even entire species, costs of disruption of community and ecosystem features, etc., barely considered. A part of the problem is that the former set of costs can easily be transformed to dollars, while the latter set of costs cannot. (Ewel et al. 1976 , Ewel 1986 ) and wetlands in which the hydroperiod has been shortened by human activities (Hofstetter 1991 ). This plant also invades less disturbed areas (Myers 1983 , Ewel 1986 ), but what is really needed, and appears not to have been published, is a full accounting of which species have been eliminated or are threatened over which areas, and what other ecological impacts have occurred or are likely to occur. This is a tall order, but without a thorough attempt at such a synthesis, no cost-benefit analysis is really possible.
The probabilities of an introduced biological-control agent going awry, and the likely costs if it does, are other aspects of cost-benefit analyses that need at least to be more explicit, even if they would have enormous confidence limits.
THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT MONITORING
Numerous authors (e.g., Funasaki et al. 1988 , Lai 1988 , Center 1995 point to the small number of known disastrous consequences of biological-control introductions relative to the many projects as evidence that the enterprise is generally safe. This claim is not cogent for two reasons. First, when one ponders the remarkable sets of circumstances allowing the detection of some of these disasters, it becomes clear that the detected cases must be a minuscule fraction of those that have occurred (Simberloff 1992) .
Consider, for example, the attack of the cactus moth on the semaphore cactus in the Florida Keys, discussed above (see Predation, parasitism, and herbivory). Be-cause of their unusual biota, the Florida Keys are wellstudied botanically; further, they are crawling with tropical-plant enthusiasts. Were this not so, the presence of the cactus on Little Torch Key might never even have been known. Even if it had been known, it is not likely that the attack of the moth would have been recognized by anyone were it not in a heavily managed site like a Nature Conservancy refuge. Further, it would almost certainly have disappeared before the attack was noticed, even in a heavily managed preserve, had not a botanist (C. Lippincott of the Fairchild Tropical Garden) been alerted by a biologist (W.T. Starmer) working on cactus-eating insects at Guantanamo Bay, who recognized the cactus moth as something not recorded from Cuba and wondered if it was also in Florida.
Very few taxa attract sufficient human interest to be observed more than cursorily by the lay public or even scientists. The extinction of the large blue (butterfly) in Great Britain would almost surely have been missed completely if it were a bug or grasshopper rather than a butterfly. Prickly pears and butterflies are highly visible, often beautiful, and collectable. Most species have none of these traits. Seen in this light, the complacency of Funasaki et al. (1988) about the dearth of known harmful effects of biological-control introductions in Hawaii seems unwarranted (Simberloff 1992). They do not describe the effort to find non-target hosts and to determine their mortality factors, or the study of community and ecosystem properties to see if they have been modified. Particularly in remote upland habitats, it is difficult to believe that the survey was at all adequate.
Many extinctions are quite mysterious, particularly the reasons why the last few individuals disappear (Simberloff 1994) . The general problem is that insufficient data are gathered to implicate and to eliminate various potential causes. That a few extinctions can confidently be assigned to a biological-control agent, far from being grounds for comfort, should be cause for alarm.
There are numerous plausible hypotheses about the detrimental effect of non-indigenous biological-control agents on native species, but some of them can never be tested because no baseline data were gathered before the introductions, and all of them would require substantially more monitoring than presently occurs. A second reason why one might not be too comforted by the fact that relatively few untoward consequences of biological control are known is that, as unlikely as extinctions are to be observed, disruption of various community or ecosystem processes is even less likely to be observed. Except at Long-Term Ecological Research sites or other intensive research sites, who monitors nutrient cycles and flows, decomposition, vectoring of symbionts, etc.? Even intensive research projects rarely monitor more than a small fraction of ecosystem traits and processes.
WOULD ANY PROTOCOLS SUFFICE?
Given the recondite and sometimes tortuous pathways by which various ecological effects occur, are there any protocols for biological-control introductions that would prevent all disasters? Probably not; ecologists simply cannot predict the effects of introduced species well enough ever to be certain (Simberloff 1991) . However, we believe that protocols for such introductions could be vastly improved. Most fundamentally, there has to be a perceptual shift from the view that most such introductions are not likely to cause trouble to the view that extensive research is required to justify a judgment that an introduction will probably be innocuous. In other words, guilty until proven innocent. This shift in modus operandi is needed generally in policies related to the environment (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993), not only in biological control.
At the very least, there must be an end to ad hoc biological-control projects, particularly aimed at insect pests, by academics and business interests. Such unofficial actions are still common, in spite of disclaimers by irate biocontrol advocates that official modern biological-control safeguards are rigorous. No one person or informal group, no matter how knowledgeable he/she is or how patently unobjectionable the release is, should be able to mount such a project. Mail-order biological-control operations must be much more tightly regulated. Even if a species has been determined to be safe in one state, no one should be allowed to transport it to another state on an ad hoc basis.
There must also be more concern in governmentsanctioned programs for host-specificity of entomo-phages and potential effects on non-target species. Just this year a Japanese coccinellid, Pseudoscymnus sp., was released in Connecticut for control of Adelges tsugae, the Japanese hemlock woolly adelgid (Grant 1995 Also, the argument that further safeguards will be so costly as to hinder biological control greatly or to shut it down entirely has to be examined critically. It is true that safeguards may be expensive, just as they are for pharmaceutical testing in the United States. But that does not mean that they are unnecessary, and the precise costs should be made explicit. It is also true that some potentially very useful technologies carry such inherent and irreversible risks that they should not permitted.
Dispersal
Several fundamental difficulties with assessing risks from biological-control agents stem from the fact that they are alive. The first is that all living organisms have dispersal means, so that, if they survive at all, they will not stay in the habitat or even region where they are introduced. The island-hopping by the cactus moth from the Lesser Antilles at least partway to Florida exemplifies the problem. In this case, previously observed island-hopping by the same species in the Hawaiian islands should have suggested the possibility, especially since this project was initiated by the Commonwealth Institute of Biological Control. In addition to spreading to different regions, biological-control agents routinely spread from agricultural or humaninfluencial habitats to other ones, including pristine ones such as nature preserves (Simberloff 1992 (Dennill et al. 1993) . Similarly, species can evolve an expanded tolerance of physical factors, such as soil contaminants (e.g., Walley et al. 1974) , that might greatly increase the probability of important ecological effects. Likewise, changes in virulence of a pathogen can occur suddenly with great potential impact. For example, the fungus Entomophaga maimaiga was introduced from Japan to Massachusetts for gypsy moth control in 1910. It was not seen again until 1989, when it caused massive epizootics among gypsy moth populations in the Northeast. Evolution of a strain with increased aggressiveness is one of two viable hypotheses (Hajek et al. 1995) . As was discussed above in another context (see The "new associations" and "neoclassical control" controversy), it is very possible that such evolutionary changes are common but generally unobserved. If a phenomenon similar to what happened to the gypsy moth occurred in an obscure non-target lepidopteran of no perceived economic significance, how could one have thought to associate the decline with an earlier introduction? In fact, would the decline or even disappearance have been noted? In any event, the potential evolution of an imported biological-control agent means that the temporal scope of potential ecological problems is much greater than is tra-ditionally assumed, just as dispersal behavior means the spatial scope is larger.
Some of the published safety-testing protocols (e.g., that for the purple loosestrife project [Malecki et al. 1993 ]) seem quite stringent, but none appear to be adequate in the context of the potential spread and evolution of the proposed control agent. It is difficult to imagine what protocols would be. And safety-testing of entomophages seems even more problematic than that of phytophages. In many countries such testing is restricted to insects of known commercial value, i.e., to a minuscule minority. Given the poor knowledge of so many insects of non-human-influenced habitats, it is difficult to imagine a protocol that would ensure an adequate scan of regional potential hosts, even aside from the possibility of ecosystem impacts, dispersal out of the region, or evolution.
Of course, other courses of action in the face of an invasive non-indigenous species, such as chemical control and benign neglect, carry their own risks. These must be carefully considered, and potential costs weighed, even though forecasting the impacts of nonindigenous species is a very imprecise science. However, as we note above, biological control should be subjected to the same rigorous cost-benefit analysis and not automatically accorded the mantle of the environmentally friendly alternative.
